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ABSTRACT 
 
  
 
This paper compares the monetary policy problem in open economies with that in 
closed economies. It is found that the monetary policy problems in open and closed 
economies are isomorphic even in the presence of distortions in a steady state and 
hence the optimal monetary policies have similar properties. On the other hand, the 
monetary policy maker in open economies has a distorted incentive to manipulate 
the terms-of-trade. Because of the additional distortion in open economies, there exist 
gains from international monetary policy cooperation even in the case of a unit 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, in contrast to the literature that abstracts from 
distortions in a steady state. Also, it is found that in the presence of distortions 
inflation bias is decreasing in openness, which is line with empirical evidence. In 
addition, this paper presents a simple transformation so that methods in closed-
economy models are easily applicable to open-economy models. 
 
 
 
 
본 연구에서는 개방경제와 폐쇄경제의 통화정책 문제를 비교한다. 개방경제와 폐쇄경제의 통화
정책 문제는 비록 정상상태에서 왜곡이 존재하더라도 같은 꼴이어서 최적 통화정책은 비슷한 성
질을 가진다. 한편, 개방경제에서 통화정책 결정자는 교역조건을 조절하고자 하는 왜곡된 유인을 
가진다. 이 왜곡으로 인해 시점 간 대체탄력성이 1이더라도 통화정책의 국제협력에 의한 이익이 
발생한다. 이 결과는 기존에 왜곡을 제외시킨 문헌의 결과와는 차이가 있다. 또한 왜곡이 존재할 
때 인플레이션 편향은 개방도가 높을수록 적어지는데, 이는 실증적인 증거와도 일치한다. 더불어 
본 연구에서는 폐쇄경제모형에서의 방법론을 개방경제모형에 쉽게 적용할 수 있는 변환을 제시
한다. 
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Ⅰ. Introduction 
 
 
This paper compares the monetary policy problem in open economies with that in 
closed economies. It has been questioned whether the inward-looking monetary 
policy that lets the exchange rate move freely is better than the fixed-exchange-rate 
monetary policy. The literature claimed that the former is better than the latter by 
showing that the monetary policy problem in open economies is isomorphic to that 
in closed economies when there is no distortion in a steady state. On the other hand, 
in open economies there exist additional distortions related to terms-of-trade 
manipulation and thus the monetary policy maker faces a different problem. To 
explore the similarities and differences between open- and closed-economy 
monetary policies, one needs to compare the monetary policy problems in the 
presence of distortions. It is the main objective of this paper. 
The contribution of this paper is three-fold. First, this paper formally shows that 
monetary policy problems in open and closed economies are isomorphic in richer 
environments. Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2001, 2002) and Galí and Monacelli (2005) 
reported the isomorphism when there is no distortion in a steady state in that 
flexible-price equilibrium is efficient without disturbances. The main implication of 
the papers is that an inward-looking monetary policy is optimal. In other words, the 
monetary policy maker should be concerned only about domestic inflation and 
output gap, and then the exchange rate will be adjusted so that international resource 
allocations are efficient. Although some coefficients of equilibrium conditions are 
different, there is a tradeoff between domestic inflation and output gap stabilization 
as in closed economy models. That is, the monetary policy problems in open and 
closed economies are structurally, and thus essentially, the same. This paper extends 
their results such that the monetary policy problems in open and closed economies 
are isomorphic even in the presence of distortions in a steady state. This extension is 
important because distortions that the monetary policy maker faces in open and 
closed economies may be different as reported in Corsetti and Pesenti (2001, 2005) 
and Benigno and Benigno (2003). In contrast to Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2002) 
and Benigno and Benigno (2003), this paper allows home bias in consumption and 
thus the real exchange rate is not trivially determined. Home bias is essential in a 
small open economy model since, otherwise, domestic production of a small open 
economy does not have any influence on welfare. 
The main reason why the literature on the isomorphism had focused on 
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environments without distortions in a steady state is that in those environments the 
standard linear-quadratic approximation method is easily applicable. In contrast, this 
paper presents a transformation in the level of monetary policy problems and does 
not rely on the linear-quadratic approximation. Thus, we can compare the monetary 
policy problems in open and closed economies directly, whereas the earlier literature 
has compared the solutions to monetary policy problems. The thing is that to show 
the isomorphism, one does not need to obtain and compare the final solutions to 
monetary policy problems. 
Second, this paper explicitly shows that the monetary policy maker tries to 
reduce output because of additional distortion in open economies. Corsetti and 
Pesenti (2001, 2005) also reported the incentive for monetary contraction in open 
economies. Since the monetary policy maker can affect overall price level of 
domestic product, he has an incentive to manipulate the terms-of-trade such that by 
revaluating the domestic currency, domestic product becomes expensive and hence 
labor supply of domestic households may be reduced. The papers showed this idea 
by examining how monetary policy surprise affects allocations. Rational individuals, 
however, understand the incentive of the monetary policy maker and thus will 
respond for that. Corsetti and Pesenti (2001, 2005) modeled nominal rigidity as 
prices are set one period in advance. In their setting, indeed, no rational expectation 
equilibrium exists when the monetary policy maker tries to manipulate the terms-of-
trade discretionally as reported by Benigno and Benigno (2003). In contrast, this 
paper models nominal rigidity by a Calvo-pricing technology and obtains the 
incentive in rational-expectation equilibrium. Benigno and Benigno (2003) 
identified the conditions under which price stabilization is an optimal monetary 
policy. That is, the paper essentially studied what fiscal instrument eliminates 
monetary policy distortions. In contrast, this paper explores the monetary policy 
maker’s incentive for a given fiscal policy, which may not be optimal, and thus 
shows how distortions affect the monetary policy problem in open economies. De 
Paoli (2009) studied the optimal monetary policy in a small open economy when 
distortions from monopolistic competition and terms-of-trade manipulation are both 
present. The paper relies on numerical analysis to see the effects of terms-of-trade 
manipulation in addition to those of monopolistic competition. In contrast, this paper 
analytically shows how the two incentives are combined. 
Third, this paper presents a simple transformation so that methods in closed 
economy models are easily applicable to open economy models. Given the extensive 
literature on monetary policy in closed economy models (for example, Clarida, Galí, 
and Gertler [1999] and Woodford [2003] among others), one may apply the 
transformation to those models to get results in open economy models directly (see 
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Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc [2011] for a recent survey on monetary policy in open 
economies). Although the model in this paper is highly stylized, it can be a good 
benchmark to understand basic intuitions. With relaxed assumption in open 
economy models, numerical approach may be required. In those situations, the 
results in this paper can be a good starting point, for example, in the homotopy 
continuation method. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the model and Section III 
derives equilibrium conditions. Section IV presents the isomorphism between 
monetary policy problems in open and closed economies in each case of cooperative 
and non-cooperative monetary policy. Section V illustrates the results with 
applications and Section VI concludes. 
 
 
II. The Model 
 
 
There are two countries, Home and Foreign, whose measures are, respectively, 
γ  and 1 γ− . If γ  is small-enough, then Home is a small open economy. Products 
are differentiated and indexed by f . Good f  in [0, ]γ  is produced at Home 
while good f  in ( ,1]γ  is at Foreign. 
 
Household 
 
Households’ preference depends on their consumption and labor supply. As is 
standard in New Keynesian models, we assume that consumption and labor supply 
are separable in the utility function. We assume further that the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution of consumption is one. This value is within a standard range 
and commonly used in the real-business cycle and New Keynesian literature. When 
the utility function is separable, a unit intertemporal elasticity of substitution is a 
condition consistent with a balanced growth path. Therefore, the preference is 
represented by 
1
0
0
n ,l
1
t t
t
t
N
C
φ
β
φ
+∞
=
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞
−⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠⎣ + ⎦
∑E
 
where 
t
E  denotes the expectation operator given information up to period t and 
β  the discount factor. 
t
C  is consumption and 
t
N  labor supply in period t. 
t
C  
is an aggregate of Home product 
ht
C  and Foreign product ftC . The elasticity of 
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substitution between Home and Foreign products is also assumed to be one. Due to 
this assumption, the monetary policy problem becomes more tractable and can be 
solved analytically. Indeed, Galí and Monacelli (2005) and Faia and Monacelli 
(2008) reported that the monetary policy that stabilizes domestic price is optimal in a 
small open economy under the elasticity assumption. Home and Foreign 
consumption aggregates are, respectively, 
 
* *
* *
1 * *1
*
1 * * 1
and ,
(1 ) (1 )
ht ft ht ft
t t
C
C
C
C
C C
ξ ξ ξ ξ
ξ ξ ξ ξξ ξ ξ ξ
− −
−
−
= =
−
−
 
 
where (1 )ξ γ η= −  and 
*ξ γη=  for [0,1]η∈ . η  measures openness of the 
economies. When η  is equal to zero, the two countries are closed economies and 
households consume domestic products only. In contrast, when η  is equal to one, 
they are fully open and the consumption weights are the same with the countries’ 
sizes. When η  is less than one, households are biased toward domestic products. In 
the limit case that γ  goes to zero with positive η , Home is a small open economy 
and Foreign is a closed economy. In the literature, two country models sometimes 
abstract from home bias in consumption. Home bias is, however, essential in a small 
open economy model because, without the assumption, Home product is negligible 
in consumption baskets and thus both Home and Foreign agents do not care about 
the amount of Home production. 
The elasticity of substitution among Home products and that among Foreign 
products are both 1θ > . That is, the aggregators of Home and Foreign products are, 
respectively, 
/ ( 1)/( 1)
( 1)/ ( 1)/
1/ 0 1/
11 1
( ) d ( ) d
(1 )
, .ht ht ft ftf f fC C C fC
θ θθ θ
γ
θ θ θ θ
θ θ γγ γ
−
−
− −
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⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠ ⎝
=
− ⎠
= ∫ ∫
 
Households’ budget constraint in state 
t
h  is 
1
1 1
1
) ) ) profits and tra( ( ( nsfers,
t
t t t
t t t t t t
h
t
C B W NP M h h B h
+
+ +
+
≤ ++ +∑
 
where 
1
1
( )t
t
hB
+
+
 is the purchase of the bond that pays one unit of domestic 
currency in state 
1t
h
+
 and 
1)( t
t
M h
+
 is the bond price. Households receive firms’ 
profits and government transfers. 
Household h is a monopolistic competitive supplier of type-h labor and sets a 
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wage rate ( )
t
W h  in each period t. Labor input is aggregated as 
0
1/
(
1
) d
w
t
w
t
t t
N N h h
μ
γ
μ
γ
⎛ ⎞
= ⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
∫ for wage markup 1
w
t
µ ≥ , which is assumed to be 
exogenous. We assume flexible wage so that it can be reset in each period. Every 
household faces the same problem of wage-setting, and the household optimization 
implies that the real wage in equilibrium is /
w
t t t t t
P CW N
φ
µ= . That is, the wage is 
equal to the marginal value of labor supply, which is equal to the marginal rate of 
substitution between consumption and labor supply, multiplied by the wage markup. 
Fluctuation of 
w
t
µ  plays a role in New Keynesian models as a cost-push shock, 
which implies a short-run trade-off between output and inflation stabilization. 
Similarly, 
*w
t
µ  is Foreign wage markup. 
 
Firm 
 
Home firm [0, ]f γ∈  produces with a constant-returns-to-scale technology 
( ) ( )
t t t
f A NY f= , where 
t
A  is a country-specific productivity. Similarly, 
*
t
A  
denotes Foreign firms’ productivity. Firms receive a subsidy τ  for each 
employment (they pay a tax if 0τ < .). Thus, firms’ nominal cost for unit 
employment is (1 )
t
Wτ− . In the terms of modeling, it doesn’t matter whether firms 
or workers receive subsidy. Moreover, sales subsidy to firms or consumption 
subsidy to households for domestic products also yields the same conclusion. 
Nominal rigidity is modeled by the assumption of a standard Calvo pricing 
technology that each firm cannot reset its price with probabilityα as introduced by 
Calvo (1983). The event is independent across firms and over time. We assume that 
a firm sets a single price in its own currency for both Home and Foreign markets. 
This implies that the law of one price holds for every individual product at all time, 
*) (( )
ht t ht
P f S P f=  and 
*( ) ( )ft t ftP f S P f= , where the nominal exchange rate tS is 
the Home currency price of Foreign currency. 
 
Financial Markets 
 
We assume that financial market is complete. We will, however, show that the 
financial market completeness is irrelevant with a certain initial condition. 
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Exogenous Stochastic Process 
 
We assume that disturbances ( , )w
t t
A µ and
* *,( )w
t t
A µ follow Markov processes. 
This assumption is not critical but necessary to write the monetary policy problem in 
a recursive form. 
 
 
III. Equilibrium 
 
 
When the elasticity of substitution between Home and Foreign products is one, 
households’ optimization implies that they spend a constant share of their total 
expenditure for each product. Home and Foreign demands for Home and Foreign 
products are, respectively, 
* * * * * *
* *
* *
(1 ) (1
, , , and
)
,t t t t t t t tht ft ht ft
ht ft ht ft
PC PC P C P C
C C C C
P P P P
ξ ξ ξ ξ− −
= = = =
 
where Home and Foreign consumer price indices are, respectively, 
1
t ht ftP P P
ξ ξ−
=  
and 
* *
* * * 1( ) )(t ht ftP PP
ξ ξ−
= . Demand functions for individual firm’s product are 
*
* *
*
*
* *
*
( ) ( )1 1
( ) , ( ) for [0, ],
( ) ( )1 1
( ) ( ) for ( ,1
1
, ],
1
ht ht
ht ht ht ht
ht ht
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ft ft ft ft
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P f P f
C f C C f C f
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P P
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where Home consumer price indices for Home and Foreign products are, 
respectively, 
1/(1 ) 1/(1 )
1
1 1
0
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1
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∫ ∫
 
By the assumption that the law of one price holds, Foreign counterparts are 
*
ht t ht
S PP =
 
and 
* *
ft t ftS PP = . 
We have assumed that financial market is complete. We will, however, show that 
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the assumption is not crucial. We start with the complete financial market. A risk 
sharing condition is that the real exchange rate is proportional to the ratio of 
marginal utilities of consumption, StPt
*
Ct
*
 = λPtCt for some λ . The constant λ  
depends on initial conditions. Then the value of Home output in period t is 
 
*
* * *(1
1
(1 )
)
{1 (1 ) } (1 )
{1 (1 )(1 ) } .
ht t ht ht ht
t t t t t
t t t t
t t
Y P C C
PC S P C
C PC
C
P
P
P
γ
γ
γ
ξ ξ
γ
γ η γ ηλ
γ λ η
=
= −
⎛ ⎞−
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⎝ ⎠
−
+
− − + −
− − −
=
=
 
That is, the value of output is always proportional to that of consumption. In 
particular, if 1λ = , they are always the same. In that case, both trade and 
investment income account balances are always zero and so is current account 
balance. Thus, equilibrium under the complete financial market is the same with that 
under financial autarky. In other words, the assumption about financial market is 
irrelevant to the equilibrium allocation. To relax financial market completeness, the 
literature on open economy models often assumes that only non-contingent bonds 
are tradable. If countries have no initial debts, they would not have any debt in the 
future, either. That is, model’s implications are the same in all the three financial 
market structures (complete financial market, financial autarky, and bond-only 
market) with a certain initial condition. We prefer the initial condition in that, on the 
one hand, it is usually assumed and, on the other hand, results do not depend on the 
model’s specification on financial market structure. 
Now we move on to firms’ price-setting problem. The problem of a firm that has 
an opportunity to reset its price in period t is 
{ }0 0 *, ,( )
0
max ( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
ht
j
t jj t t
t ht h t j h t jP f
j t j t j t j
WC P
P f C f C f
C P A
β
α τ γ γ
∞
+
+ +
= + + +
⎡ ⎤⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪
− − + −⎢ ⎥⎨ ⎬
⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥⎩ ⎭⎣ ⎦
∑E
 
subject to the sequence of demand functions. The additional discount factor 
j
α  
reflects the probability that the firm’s price set in period t cannot be reset until 
period t+j. One can see that all firms setting new prices face the same problem. Thus, 
we drop the index f in the optimal reset price. Note, also, that the law of one price 
implies that 
* *( ) / ( ) /
ht ht ht ht
f P P f PP =  for all f in [0, ]γ . Then, the first order 
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condition is 
0 0 1 *
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0
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where (1 ) p w
t t
τ μ μΦ ≡ − . 
t
Φ  represents distortions of the economy, that is, 
distortionary subsidy, price markup, and wage markup. By the market clearing 
condition, 
*(1 )
t ht ht
Y C Cγ γ γ= + −  for all t, we have 
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Since the values of output and consumption are always the same, 
,h t j t j t j t jY PP C+ + + += , we obtain the optimality condition 
0
,
ht t
ht t
P K
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,
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P
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−
∞
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That is, the price is a weighted average of current and future marginal costs 
multiplied by markups. In these equations, we can see that the marginal cost does 
not depend on Foreign variables. As explained in Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2002), a 
rise in Foreign output affects the marginal cost in two channels, terms-of-trade and 
wealth effects. With a unit elasticity of substitution, the two effects are exactly offset. 
We may rewrite these equations recursively as 
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Since the aggregate price of Home products evolves as 
1 0 1 1/(1 )
, 1[ ( ) (1 )( ) ] ,ht h t htP P P
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α α
− − −
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dividing both sides by 
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P  we have 
1
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t
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K
F
θ
θ
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−
−
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where 
ht
Π  is the gross inflation rate of Home product in period t. Rewriting the 
equation, we obtain t
ht
t
K
g
F
⎛ ⎞
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, where 
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1/( 1)
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−
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The labor market clearing condition is 
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where the last equality follows from 
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The more price dispersion, the more labor supply required given output and 
productivity. Price dispersion, hence, represents the inefficiency due to nominal 
rigidity. 
In sum, equilibrium conditions include 
1
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,
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+
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E                        (1) 
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There are five variables in the four equations above. The remaining equation is the 
monetary policy function. As is standard in the optimal policy literature, we do not 
explicitly express the policy function. We, instead, describe the relationship among 
the endogenous variables in equilibrium. 
 
 
IV. The Monetary Policy Problem and Transformation 
 
 
For a normative analysis of the monetary policy, we set the objective function of 
the policy maker explicitly based on individuals’ preference. That is, a benevolent 
policy maker is to maximize the expected utility of households subject to private 
agents’ optimality conditions. The welfare function of Home policy maker is, 
therefore, 
1
0
0
ln
1
t t
t
t
N
C
φ
β
φ
+∞
=
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞
−⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟
⎦+⎝ ⎠⎣
∑E . 
It is convenient to rewrite the welfare function in terms of output instead of 
consumption. The real exchange rate 
t
Q (the price of Foreign consumption basket in 
terms of Home consumption basket) and terms-of-trade 
t
J (the price ratio of 
imported goods to exported goods) have the following relationship. 
( ) ( ) ( )
* *
1 1 * *ln lln (1 ) ln ln (1 )n l .nt ht ft ht ft ft htP P P P PQ P J
ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ− −= = − −− =− −−
 
Then we can rewrite the risk sharing condition 
*
t t t
C QC=  as 
* *(1 ) lnln .ln
t t t
JC Cξ ξ= − − +                                (5) 
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Since the values of Home output and consumption are always the same, 
ln( ln
) ln
ln )
(1 ln ln ln
ln ln .
t t t ht
ht ft t ht
t t
PC P
P P C P
Y
J C
ξ ξ
ξ
−
+
=
+ −
+
=
= −                         (6) 
Its Foreign counterpart is 
* * *
ln ln l .n
t t t
Y J Cξ= − +                                       (7) 
Solving equations (5), (6), and (7) simultaneously, we obtain 
*ln (1 ) ln l .n
t t t
C Y Yξ ξ= − +
  
Therefore, the objective function of Home policy maker is 
1
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Its Foreign counterpart is 
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Now, we are ready to compare monetary policies in open and closed economies. 
 
Monetary Policy Problem in Closed Economies 
 
If 0ξ = , then Home is a closed economy. The consumer price and domestic 
price are identical and so are inflations, 
ht t
Π =Π . Therefore, the monetary policy 
problem is 
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Cooperative Monetary-policy Problem 
 
The monetary policy makers in the two countries maximize the weighted sum of 
the expected utilities of the two countries. We assume that every individual is 
equally weighted. That is, the weights of the two countries are proportional to the 
countries’ sizes, γ  and 1 γ− . Then the objective function is 
1 *1
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where we used 
*(1 ) (1 )γ ξ γ ξ γ− + =−  and 
*(1 )(1 ) 1γξ γ ξ γ+ − =− − . Note 
that Home and Foreign variables in the objective function are additively separable. 
Also, the set of equilibrium conditions are divided into equations with Home 
variables and with Foreign variables. Thus, the optimal cooperative monetary policy 
should solve 
1
0
0
( )
max ln
1
t t t
t
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subject to (1), (2), (3), and (4). The only difference from the monetary policy 
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problem in closed economies is domestic inflation rather than CPI inflation. 
 
Proposition 1 (Cooperative monetary policy) The monetary policy problem in 
open economies is isomorphic to that in closed economies with a 
transformation 
t ht
Π →Π . 
 
Remark The key reason for the isomorphism is that Home marginal cost does not 
depend on Foreign variables explicitly in open economies. Firms’ price 
setting is summarized by 
t
K  and 
t
F , from which we can see the optimal 
reset price is the weighted average of current and future marginal costs. In 
general, Foreign production may affects Home marginal cost through two 
channels. First, if Foreign output increases, Home output becomes 
relatively scarce and hence the terms-of-trade improves. Given Home 
consumption level, it reduces Home marginal cost. Second, if Foreign 
output increases, so does Home consumption. Then the marginal value of 
leisure increases and thus labor input becomes more expensive. Therefore, 
the wealth effect by a rise in Foreign output implies higher Home marginal 
cost. As reported in Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2002), the two effects are 
exactly offset when the elasticity of substitution is one. Thus, Home 
marginal cost does not depend on Foreign output directly. The property 
holds regardless of distortions, which is the main factor for Proposition 1. 
 
The result in Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2002) can be directly implied by 
Proposition 1. Compared with Proposition 1, the paper assumed no distortions in a 
steady state and showed their results in an approximated problem. We could extend 
their results because we compared not the solutions to the policy problems but the 
policy problems themselves. 
 
Non-cooperative Monetary-policy Problem 
 
The monetary policy maker maximizes Home households’ expected utility given 
Foreign agents’ decision. Now we will show a transformation that links the 
monetary policy problem in open economies to that in closed economies. Let 
1/(1 )(1 )
t t
YY
φξ − +≡ −% . Then we may rewrite the objective function as 
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Note that the second term is independent of Home monetary policy. Thus, the 
problem of the non-cooperative policy maker can be rewritten as 
1
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where (1 )
t t
ξΦ ≡ − Φ%  and 
t ht
Π ≡ Π% . The transformed problem has the same 
structure with that of the monetary policy problem in closed economies. 
 
Proposition 2 (Non-cooperative monetary policy) The monetary policy problem 
in open economies is isomorphic to that in closed economies with a 
transformation 
1/(1 ), , ) ((1 ) ) , )( , (1
t t t t t ht
Y Y
φξ ξ− + Φ−Φ Π → − Π . 
 
Compared to the problem in closed economies, there is an additional term in 
distortions (1 )ξ− . That is, the monetary policy maker in open economies behaves 
as if there is a distortionary employment subsidy ξ . In other words, Home output is 
produced too much due to the subsidy in the view point of the policy maker and thus 
should be reduced at optimum. 
The welfare function, equation (8), shows that only (1 )ξ−  portion of domestic 
output is consumed by Home households in equilibrium. Thus, the tradeoff between 
consumption and labor supply is different in open economies. In particular, labor 
supply in open economies should be less than that in closed economies. That is, the 
open-economy monetary policy should be more contractionary. 
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V. Applications 
 
 
To illustrate the results in this paper, we present three applications. The first 
application shows that the results in the early literature can be easily driven by the 
transformation in this paper. The second application explores differences between 
the monetary policy in open and closed economies. The main difference is the 
distortions that the monetary policy maker faces. Due to this difference, there are 
gains from monetary policy cooperation, which is a different implication from 
Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2002). The final application shows how to obtain 
inflation bias in open economies with results in closed economy models. 
 
 
1. Stabilization in the Case of a Non-distorted Steady State. 
 
First, in the cases of the monetary policy cooperation, Proposition 1 says that the 
only difference in monetary policies is inflations that the policy maker targets. Thus, 
without distortions in a steady state, the result that the monetary policy maker in 
closed economies balances inflation and output gap stabilization continues to hold in 
open economies in that the policy maker balances domestic inflation and output gap 
stabilization. 
Now we move on to the cases of the non-cooperative monetary policy. Suppose 
that fiscal policy is set such that there is no distortion in a steady state, 1Φ =%  or 
((1 ) ) 11 p wξ τ μ μ−− = . Note that the log deviations from the efficient output do not 
change by the transformation, ln ln ln ln
e e
t t
Y Y Y Y− = −% % , where 
e
Y  is output in 
the flexible price equilibrium. Therefore, if one expresses the monetary policy in 
terms of output gap and inflation, the solutions to the monetary policy problems in 
open and closed economies would be the same except that in open economies 
domestic inflation is used instead of consumer price inflation. Again, in equilibrium 
the monetary policy would balance domestic inflation and output gap stabilization. 
Galí and Monacelli (2005) assumed that the wage markup is always one in a small 
open economy. Remind that as γ  goes to zero, Home is a small open economy and 
(1 )ξ γ η η= − → . The paper further assumed that )(1 )(1 1pη τ μ− =− . Then 
1
t
Φ =%  for all t. In closed economies without a cost-push shock, price stabilization 
is an optimal monetary policy. According to the transformation in this paper, the 
open-economy counterpart is that domestic price stabilization is an optimal 
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monetary policy, which is the same with the result in Galí and Monacelli (2005). 
We have shown that in both cases, one can obtain the optimal monetary policy in 
open economies directly by applying the transformation in this paper. When there is 
no distortion in a steady state, the optimal monetary policy in open and closed 
economies are very similar. The subsidy rates for a non-distorted steady state are, 
however, different in open and closed economies. In the next subsection, we will 
show that the difference has an important implication. 
 
 
2. Gains from Monetary Policy Cooperation 
 
This paper claims that there exist gains from monetary policy cooperation since 
the non-cooperative monetary policy maker has an incentive to reduce domestic 
output. Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2002) reported that there are no gains from 
monetary policy cooperation when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is one. 
The main point of the paper is that with a unit elasticity of substitution Foreign 
output level does not affect Home marginal cost. An important assumption of the 
paper is that fiscal policy eliminates distortions in a steady state in both cooperative 
and non-cooperative cases. The required subsidy rates are, however, different in the 
two cases. We, hence, examine whether there exist gains from monetary policy 
cooperation given fiscal policy. 
 
Proposition 3 Given fiscal policy, there are gains from monetary policy cooperation. 
 
Proof. At optimum the welfare in the cooperative monetary policy cannot be less 
than that in the non-cooperative monetary policy. Then it is enough to show 
that the optimal non-cooperative monetary policy does not solve the problem 
of the cooperative monetary policy. The optimal non-cooperative monetary 
policy maximizes
1
0
0
)
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1
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,t t t
t
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φ
+∞
=
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+⎩ ⎭
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∑E while the optimal 
cooperative monetary policy does
1
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0
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l
(
n
1
,t t t
t
t
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+∞
=
⎧ ⎫Δ
⎨ ⎬
+⎩ ⎭
⎡ ⎤
−⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦
∑E where the 
constraints (1), (2), and (3) are common in the two cases. It is obvious that 
the solutions to the two problems are different, which completes the proof. 
 
The non-cooperative policy maker induces less output than the cooperative 
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policy maker does. As we have already explained, the reason is that the non-
cooperative policy maker ignores Foreign consumption of domestic output. Corsetti 
and Pesenti (2001, 2005) also reported that the monetary policy maker in open 
economies has an incentive to manipulate the terms-of-trade. By more 
contractionary monetary policy, domestic outputs become more expensive and 
domestic households supply less labor. Although domestic consumption is also 
reduced, the reduction of labor supply has larger effect on the welfare. Therefore, 
the monetary policy maker tries to revalue the domestic currency. 
The difference from the early literature is that we compare the welfares for given 
fiscal policy. The main lesson is that in open economies the monetary policy makers 
have a distorted incentive, which can be eliminated by the international monetary 
cooperation. 
 
 
3. Inflation Bias 
 
Following from the seminal papers of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro 
and Gordon (1983), a large literature has studied the problem of inflation bias under 
discretionary or time-consistent monetary policy. This paper compares inflation bias 
in open and closed economies. This exercise will illustrate the differences of 
monetary policies in open and closed economy more clearly. Also, through the 
exercise one can see how to apply the transformation in this paper. 
First, remind that the values of consumption and output are always the same, 
t t ht t
PC P Y= . In terms of inflations, we have 
1 1
/ ( )
t ht t t t t
YC CY
− −
Π = Π . Therefore, 
the consumer price inflation and domestic inflation are the same in stationary 
equilibrium, 
h
Π =Π . That is, it is not necessary to distinguish the two inflations in 
stationary equilibrium. 
The optimal inflation rate in stationary equilibrium of the Ramsey problem is 
zero (Π = 1) as shown in Benigno and Woodford (2005). Now consider the optimal 
inflation rate in stationary equilibrium of the time-consistent policy problem. Since 
we are focusing on stationary equilibrium, exogenous aggregate variables are 
assumed to have their steady state values. The equilibrium concept here is a Markov 
perfect equilibrium. As in Klein, Krusell, and Ríos-Rull (2008), a time-consistent 
equilibrium consists of a value function )(·V  and policy functions 
{ ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )Y K F ′Δ Δ Δ Δ Δ% } such that for all 1Δ ≥ , the policy functions solve 
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One may think this problem as the monetary policy maker in each period chooses 
current monetary policy given the future policy function. That is, the monetary 
policy maker cannot commit future policy. Nonetheless, monetary policy in each 
period affects future policy through the state variable Δ . The monetary policy 
maker rationally expects that the future monetary policy is also optimal given price 
dispersion in the future period. The allocations in a stationary equilibrium satisfy 
( )′Δ = Δ Δ , ( )K K= Δ , ( )F F= Δ . Then the inflation in the stationary 
equilibrium is 
K
g
F
⎛ ⎞
Π = ⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
% . Inflation bias is, therefore, 1 1
K
g
F
⎛ ⎞
Π − = −⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
. 
In a closed economy model, Woodford (2003) showed that when distortion is 
small (that is, 1
t
Φ ≈% ), inflation bias is 
(1 )(1 )( 1)
.
(1 ) (1 )(1 )(1 )
α αβ
α β θ α αβ φ
− − Φ −
− + − − +  
According to the transformation, inflation bias in open economies is 
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Proposition 4 Inflation bias is decreasing in openness in the case of small 
distortions. 
 
Although we conjecture that the proposition holds even in the case of large 
distortions, we have not proved it yet. Proposition 4 is in line with the empirical 
result in Romer (1993), which reported that average inflation was lower in more 
open economies. 
Corsetti and Pesenti (2001, 2005) also reported the difference in open and closed 
economies and less inflationary bias in open economies. The papers, however, 
examined how unanticipated monetary shocks affect the welfare. The exercise in the 
papers is useful to understand intuition but inconsistent with rational expectation 
equilibrium. In their model, agents set price one period in advance. Anticipated 
inflations do not have any effect on the allocations and thus welfare. That is, if 
agents understand the policy maker’s incentive and expect contractionary monetary 
policy, they will change prices accordingly. Indeed, there is no time-consistent 
rational expectation equilibrium when the monetary policy maker has such an 
incentive. In contrast, we model nominal rigidity by a Calvo-pricing technology and 
obtain inflation bias in rational expectation equilibrium. 
For calibration we mostly follow Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), 
which is a key paper in the literature on monetary policy estimation. We let the 
period length be a quarter and the discount factor 
0.25
1.03β −= , which implies an 
annualized real interest rate of 3%. The inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor 
supply is set to be one, 1φ = . The Calvo-pricing parameter is 0.6α = , which 
means that firms change their prices every 2.5 quarters on average. Price and wage 
markups are 1.2
p
µ =  and 1.05
w
µ = . 
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) studied a closed economy and 
abstracted from fiscal policy. In open economies, we need to calibrate the weight of 
imports in the consumption basket ξ . The volume of international trade has been 
growing faster than world production. A reason is the globalization of supply chains 
as reported in Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001). As each country has specialized in 
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particular production stages, trades of intermediate goods have increased rapidly. In 
such supply chains, a fraction of imports are used not for domestic consumption but 
for export. For our purpose, we may have to exclude imports for export. In the 
model in this paper, the values of consumption and output are the same. Hence, ξ  
is the ratio of imports to GDP, where imports should include only goods and 
services for domestic use. For calibration we have chosen the Korean economy. The 
value of imports to Korea is about a half of the value of GDP of Korea. Around 60 
percent of imports are for domestic use. Thus, we set 0.3ξ = . 
The remaining parameter is the employment subsidy τ . Note that it does not 
matter whether firms or workers receive subsidy and that sales subsidy to firms or 
consumption subsidy to households for domestic products also yields the same 
conclusion. The thing is the overall distortion by fiscal policy. To calibrate the 
subsidy, we use the total tax revenue (excluding social security) in the OECD 
database. The tax revenue of the Korean economy in 2012 is about 20.2% of GDP, 
which is a little higher than the OECD average. Thus, we set 0.202τ = − . 
Then the overall distortion is 1.06Φ =%  or 6%, which is far smaller than the 
corresponding distortion in closed economies, 1.51Φ =%  or 51%. With these 
parameters the annualized inflation bias in the open economy is estimated to be 
about 2.0%, which is far less than that in closed economies, 18.2%. That is, the 
monetary policy maker in the open economy has far smaller inflationary bias. 
Although the model in this paper is highly stylized and thus the estimates of 
inflation bias should be interpreted with caution, this example shows that the 
distortion from terms-of-trade manipulation may be as important as the distortions 
from price and wage markups. 
When distortions are not small-enough, one may not use a perturbation method 
around an efficient equilibrium. In closed economy models Anderson, Kim, and Yun 
(2010) obtained inflation bias in a Markov perfect equilibrium using a projection 
method. The numerical method is also applicable to the problem in open economies 
by adjusting distortions. 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
 
This paper has shown that the monetary policy problem in open economies is 
isomorphic to that in closed economies even in the presence of distortions. From the 
transformation, we have learned that the key difference between open and closed 
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economies is the distortion that the monetary policy maker faces. Due to the 
difference of the distortion, there are gains from monetary policy cooperation, and 
the time-consistent monetary policy is less inflationary in open economies. 
An important assumption in this paper is that the elasticity of substitution is equal 
to one. Although with other elasticity values one may not obtain the isomorphism 
analytically and needs to rely on numerical approach, it is important to understand 
how different distortions are in open and closed economies. Another direction for 
future work is to relax the assumption of perfect exchange rate pass-through. In the 
cases of local-currency pricing, Engel (2011) showed that the monetary policy 
maker should be concerned about currency misalignments and target consumer price 
inflation instead of domestic inflation. Then it is a key question whether the time-
consistent monetary policy is less inflationary in open economies in the cases of 
imperfect exchange rate pass-through. 
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